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Territorialization, Resistance and
the Mirage of Permanent Boundaries
Forests of the Western Himalayas, 1876-1897
Ashwini Chhatre
Duke University
ABSTRACT
Internal territorialization is described as the attempt to circumscribe the use of various resources, such
as land and forests, within the boundaries of a nation-state. This translates into the creation of property
rights for different social actors and the demarcation of a physical sphere wherein such rights could be
exercised. The notion of permanent boundaries around forests, where local people lack property rights, is
popular with all arms of the state, everywhere.
This paper traces the first attempts by the colonial state in the Indian Western Himalayas to draw
boundaries around forests and define the rights of local populations. The process, which intensified with
the publication of a Forest Department report in 1876, was fraught with obstacles at several levels throughout its course. It met sustained resistance from the peasants, who fought restrictions on their use of the
forests. More importantly, horizontal tensions across different departments and vertical tensions between
local knowledge professed by provincial bureaucracy on the one hand, and central direction emanating
from the scientific establishment around forest management on the other, frustrated any attempt at uniformity in state responses. All these factors worked in tandem over the last quarter of the 19'11 century in Kulu
sub-division, a site saliently embedded in the emerging political economy as seen in expanding canal
irrigation in the Punjab as well as rising demand for the prized timber abundant in Kulu .
I argue that the project to create permanent boundaries around forests was never accomplished in
Kulu, with the Forest Settlement Report of 1897 failing both to keep the people out of forests and to
bridge intra-state divisions. This triumvirate of mutual tensions-local resistance, local knowledge, and
central direction-was instrumental in constituting the 'state' and proved to be the salient feature of later
state-society interactions.

Introduction
In the summer of 1999, approximately 750 square kilometers of territory in the western Himalayas, in the district of Kullu in the northern Indian state of Himachal
Pradesh, was declared closed to local populations and notified (officially designated) as the Great Himalayan National Park. Following the procedure laid down in the Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, the rights of any
claimants to the resources inside the Park were extinguished; out of the more than 15,000 users, a small compensation was ordered for those whose names app,eared in
the records that were consulted by the powers-that-be to
determine legitimate users. Curiously, this legitimacy was
derived from records more than a century old, of 1897 vintage, from the first forest settlement in the region that demarcated almost the whole area into different classes of

forests and determined and codified the nature and extent
of rights in all of these forests.
The notification of the National Park appeared to culminate a 15-year struggle of the Forest Department and
the conservation lobby in India to secure the area for the
conservation of precious western Himalayan biological diversity in general. However, events beginning in the fol lowing summer and autumn and continuing until the autumn of 2001 illuminated the difficulty of calling an end to
the problem. Immediately following the notification and
the extinguishing of rights, local populations organized
themselves to lobby their political representatives for redress . Through a combination of moral economy, feisty insolence, and electoral arithmetic, local populations were
successful in securing access to the legally denied resources
inside the Park, circumventing the restrictions and threats
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posed by the Forest Department and the law.
Examples of successful resistance by local cornrnunjties to state efforts at exclusion are common across the nondeveloped world. What this paper attempts to accomplish
is to situate the events in the Great Himalayan National
Park within the larger political ecology and environmental
history of the region and provide a historical context to the
resistance. I argue that the events of 1999 in the Great Himalayan National Park were preconfigured in significant
ways by the history of territorialization through legal categories witnessed in the region and by the state-society
relationship that evolved as a consequence of this history.
The process in Kullu fur thers our understanding of ten·itorialization and the diverse ways in which interaction of state
and social actors at the disaggregated level influences the
outcomes .

Territorialization and its troubled relationsh ip to
resistance
Ramachandra Guha has argued that the Indian colonial
state, spurred by the rising demand for timber and the prospect of running out of supplies, appropriated large tracts of
'wastes' and classified these as state forests. This process,
which began in the mid-nineteenth century, resulted in widespread dispossession of rural communities heavily dependent on forests for subsistence. The Indian Forest Act of
1878, the sequel to the much milder statute of 1865, provided the state with the necessary teeth to accomplish this
takeover, through classification of forests into neat categories.1 The changeover to total state control of forests within
a few decades has been termed a watershed in defining the
state-society relationship around forests in colonial India.
Elsewhere, Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso have argued that such internal territorialization, understood as allocation of property rights in land and a determination of
resource-use patterns set within a totalitarian bureaucratic
framework and embedded in a spatial grid within the boundaries of a nation-state, has progressed linearly through three
phases. In the first phase, the state asserts its ownership of
all unoccupied lands, particularly forests, and codifies titles
and property rights. Thereafter, it proceeds to curtail resource-use through a legal classification of forest lands,
earmarked as permanent forests, unavailable for appropriation for cultivation. Finally, the forests are reclassified according to scientific categories-soils, watershed regimes,
wildlife, etc .-further eroding user rights of local populations?
1
Ramachandra Guha, 'Forestry in British and Post British
India :An Historical Analysis', Economic and Political Weekly,
vol. XVII, 1983, pp 1882-96.
2
Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso, 'Territmialization and
state power in Thailand', Theory and Society, 24:3, June 1995,
pp 385-426.
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State po licies of exclusion have often been thwarted
from within, particularly because of the conflicting and
sometimes contradictory interests and responsibilities of
competing arms of the state. Thus, the Revenue Department in colonial India has been characterized as resisting
the predatory designs of the Forest Department. Even within
the colonial Forest Department, there appear to be different positions with respect to the best course of action . Between the annexationist, pragmatic, and populist positions,
the particular thrust of the Indian Forest Act of 1878 is
seen as evidence of the victory of the annexationist school
of thought and the end of the debate. 3 Other scholars have
challenged this portrayal of an unalloyed victory for the
hawks . Saberwal traces the history of interdepartmental
conflict and rivalry well past the colorual period and asserts that the Forest Department never succeeded in fully
realizing its avowed control over teJTitory and was successfully thwarted by the revenue department in the colonial period and by elected representatives in the post-colonial period. 4 Sivaramakrishnan contradicts the notion of a
unified and centralized state with perfect and total command over its territories . In documenting the process in
colonial eastern India, he highlights the tension between
local authority and central direction and argues that the
centralized body of knowledge that passed for scientific
forestry was disputed by local officials in Bengal, resulting in a 'limited conservancy' within the parameters decided locally. 5 Vandergeest and Peluso, speaking for Thailand, argue that the project of territorialization is ultimately
unsuccessful, as a result of continued peasant resistance.6
That local populations resist the processes of territorialization is beyond qualification. In the Indian case, Gadgil
and Guha have documented the numerous and continuous
peasant and tribal revolts that can be traced directly to the
state-sponsored curtailment of forest use consequent to
appropriation. 7 Both Sivaramakrishnan 8 and Vandergeest

3
Ramachandra Guha, 'An early environmental debate : The
making of the 1878 forest act', Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. XXVII, 1990, pp 65-84.
4
Vasant Saberwal, Pastoral Politics: Bureaucrats, Shepherds
and Conservation in the Western Himalaya, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
5
K. Sivaramakrishnan, 'A Hmited forest conservancy in southwest Bengal, 1864-1912', Journal of Asian Studies, 56: I, February 1997, pp75-112.
6
Vandergeest and Peluso, Op cit. pp 412
7
Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, 'State Forestry
and social conflict in British India', Past and Present, 123, May
1989, pp 141-177; Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This
fissured land: An ecological hlstory oflndia, Deihl, Oxford University Press, 1992.
• K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests : Statemaking and
Environmental change in colonial eastern India, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999.
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and Peluso 9 attribute some agency to peasant and tribal
populations that are affected directly, in deflecting the threat
of centralized control and restrictions. All seem to be in
agreement that territorialization, unsuccessful and limited
as the case may be, does proceed through legal categories
such as reserved and protected forests, wildlife sanctuaries, and national parks.

It is precisely at this crossroads of territorialization and
resistance, as well as through interdepartmental conflicts
and center/local tensions, that the issues can be probed further to get at the nuances of the project of territorialization.
The history of territorialization in Kullu subdivision of
Kangra district in nineteenth century Punjab provides us
with such a unique glimpse of the colonial state in India at
a historical moment. 10

The significance of Kullu
Kullu is comprised almost entirely of the upper catchment of the river Beas, an important tributary of the Indus
in the western Himalayas. It was annexed by the British in
1849, followed by the first revenue settlement in 1852. The
settlement was cursory and represented the first phase of
territorialization; all unoccupied lands were declared to be
state property. Forest conservancy did not begin in any seriousness unti11868 when twenty-six blocks of forest were
demarcated and transferred to the newly formed and thinly
manned Forest Department. The demand for timber to meet
the expansion of civil and military infrastructure in Punjab
was initially met from forests in the jurisdiction of local
tributary states such as Chamba and Bashahar through logging leases. 11 By the end of the 1870s, however, there was
an acute awareness of an impending shortfall of supplies
and the unreliability of tributary states in enforcing strict
conservancy. It was also the time of the expansion of the
expansive canal iiTigation systems and the railways in the
plains of Punjab, with the likely prospect of a widening
gulf between the demand and supply of quality timber. 12
Kullu was the only area under British administration
with large and contiguous forests of the Himalayan cedar,
the timber of choice of the Forest Department, within easy

• Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995.
1
° Kullu, the territory now known as Kullu District in the
state of Himachal Pradesh, was a sub-division in the district
Kangra in Punjab province during the period under discussion . It
was merged with Himachal Pradesh in 1966.
11
Mahesh Rangarajan, 'Imperial Agendas and India's Forests: The early history of Indian forestry, 1800-1878', Indian
Economic and Social History Review, vol. XXXI, 1994, pp 147167.
12
lndu Agnihotri, 'Ecology, Landuse and Colonization: The
canal colonies of Punjab', Indian Economic and Social History
Review, vol. 33: I, 1996, pp 37-58.

reach of the substantial perennial rivers required to transport the timber. By 1870, senior bureaucrats were convinced
that the forest wealth of Kullu needed to be managed scientifically to ensure sustained yields. In 1876, three forest
offi.c ials-Dietrich Brandis, the Inspector General ofForests,13 B . H. Baden Powell, Conservator of Forests, Punjab,
and Lt. Col. Stenhouse, Deputy Conservator of Forests,
Kangra district-surveyed the area and provided detailed
suggestions for the demarcation of the best forests in Kullu.
They estimated that of the total area of approximately 1,200
square miles, only about 400 could be said to be under
forest. 14 In their report, they suggested that about 150 square
miles be demarcated and subsequently managed for timber production. They also emphasized the need to separate
forests to be made available for the expansion of cultivation from those to be maintained permanently as forests.
The report met with universal approval within the colonial
bureaucracy; revenue and forest officials alike responded
enthusiastically to the proposed demarcations. Over the next
two decades, however, actors at the local, provincial, and
national levels interpreted the report differently in the light
of the brand new Indian Forest Act of 1878. The legal categories were deliberated, interpretations were disputed, and
fault lines emerged within the state apparatus as Kullu
emerged as a 'zone of anomaly'; a strict application of the
legal categories prescribed in the 1878 law was thwarted
by the provincial Revenue Department through a characterization of Kullu as anomalous. 15 Besides the Forest De13

The nomenclature of colonial bureaucracy is liberally
sprinkled all over tllis paper. It will be useful at tllis stage to provide a brief introduction. Territories below the provincial level
(e.g. Punjab) were Division (as in Jullunder Division), District
(as in Kangra), and Sub-division (as in Kullu). At each level, the
corresponding Revenue Department Officials were Financial
Comnlissioner (Provincial), Comnlissioner and Superintendent
(Divisional), Deputy Comnlissioner (District) and Assistant Cornmissioner (Sub-division) . Above all these was Secretary to the
Government of Punjab (usually in charge of Revenue, Agriculture and Forests) and the Secretary to the Government of India.
The Forest Department was organized in parallel to this structure. The basic unit was the Forest Division (such as Beas Division, under wllich Kullu fell), which was much smaller than the
Revenue Department Division. At the Forest Division level, was
the Deputy Conservator of Forests. Above tllis was the Conservator of Forests at the Provincial level (Punjab). The top official
in the Forest Department was the Inspector General of Forests, in
charge of the whole country.
14
This ratio of forests to total area is not unusual in Kullu .
Even in the Great Himalayan National Park, only a third of the
area is under forest, the rest being equally divided between permanent snow and rocks above the line of possible life, and the
expansive alpine meadows above the line of tree grmvth and below the permanent snow.
15
Sivaramakrishnan has used the term zones of anomaly in
describing 'geographic spaces in the teiTain targeted by the Per-
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partment-Revenue Department axis, there emerged a strong
local bureaucratic response to central direction, in interaction with the resistance of the local populations ·to the new
and proposed restrictions. As the debate moved from an
inter-departmental conflict, through the center-local tensions, to the formulation of a compromise, overt peasant
resistance in the late 1880s once again foiled attempts to
implement and enforce the new detente.
This paper argues that the debate concerning demarcation of forests in Kullu could be characterized as between
intensive and extensive territorialization, rather than between annexationists and pragmatists or populists. The intensive territorialization position demanded a focus on demarcating a small area of productive forests, with 'full
ownership' of the state (and management control of the
Forest Department) and no meddlesome rights of local
populations, leaving the rest in loose control of the Revenue Department and managed with the help of local notables. The extensive territorialization position entailed a
demarcation of all forest land as state property and managed as forests with a hierarchy of rights and privileges for
the local populations. Such a distinction allows us to get
away from the debate amongst forest officials on the Indian Forest Act of 1878 and to bring in the perspectives
and arguments of officers of the Revenue Department,
which played a major role in interpreting the provisions of
the Act at the provincial level.
Secondly, in the compromise that was worked out in
Kullu, legal categories were re-interpreted in ways that
defied and sometimes contradicted central direction as represented by the 1878 law. This compromise was necessarily a middle ground between intensive and extensive positions and resulted in what I call vertical territorialization.
In the new arrangement, almost the whole territory ofKullu
was demarcated, but it was also carefully classified into
vertically arranged categories that progressively curtailed
rights of local populations. Interestingly, these new categories were nested within the classification ordained in
the central law, while deviating from its salient features in
significant ways. Vertical territorialization also combined
the intensive and extensive positions in imaginative dimensions by creating a supra-tenure of reserved species and
temporally circumscribed rights over the whole territory,
and most significantly, by creating a vertical pyramid of
rightholders graded according to ownership of land.
Thirdly, sustained resistance to new regulations regarding fire, grazing, and timber for local populations thwarted
state attempts at restrictions and raised question marks
against the notion of permanent boundaries around · state
forests, a notion central to the project of territorialization
and cherished by all arms of the state. Initially, the Revenue Department used this resistance.to strengthen its characterization ofKullu as a zone of anomaly and to rally sup-
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port across the departmental divide for the cause of local
knowledge against central direction. In the end, the resistance of local populations led to a breakdown of local consensus between the Revenue and Forest Departments.
Finally, this three-way interaction, between central direction, local resistance, and claims to local knowledge,
defined the contours of the nascent colonial state in Kullu
and the range and domain of state-society relationships
around forests, elements of which can be witnessed in the
events that unfolded in the Great Himalayan National Park
in 1999 . Moreover, vertical territorialization had serious
consequences for the process of state formation, in the form
of an enduring configuration of forest rights for vertically
arranged social actors in vertically organized forest classes.

The War of Attrition
The Joint Report by Brandis, Baden-Powell, and
Stenhouse 16 (Joint Report) on the demarcation of forests
in Kullu was submitted to Government of India in late 1876
and made its way to provincial officers by the middle of
1877. It attracted praise for its balanced treatment of the
subject and was welcomed by all and sundry as the correct
way to proceed on the vexing forest question. 17 In one of
the first cautionary notes to the possible implications of
the Joint Report, James Lyall, senior Revenue Department
official and the last bureaucrat to have carried out a Revenue Settlement in Kullu in 1875, noted that if the provisions of the report are carried out in a "harsh and unbending" manner, there may result "much injury and annoyance" to the local population. 18 In a detailed reply, BadenPowell, co-author of the report and Conservator of Forests, asserted that "unless the reservation ... is undertaken
it is impossible simply that this department can be responsible, either for the safety of the soil, or the continued sup-

manent Settlement (of 1793) in Bengal wh£re its application was
thwarted' (K. Sivaramakrishnan 1999 op cit.). I am deploying the
term in a broader sense, signifying spaces of resistance within
the state apparatus created by regional and provincial actors and
deployed against central direction, by creating an identity that
was essentially anomalous and therefore not amenable to universal principles.
16
D. Brandis, B.H. Baden-Powell and Lieut.-Col. W.
Stenhouse, Suggestions regarding the Demarcation and Management of the Forests in Kullu, 11'h November, 1876, Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1877.
17
A. Brandreth, C&S, Jullunder Div., to Secy to FC, Punjab,
No.1935, dated Jullunder, 13'h August 1878, Printed Correspondence of Forests in Kullu , Basta #21, Serial #320, Kangra DC
Records, Himachal Pradesh State Archives, Shimla (henceforth
Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla).
18
E.B. Francis, Offg. Secy. to FC, Punjab, to Secy. to Govt.,
Punjab, No.943, dated Lahore, 21 ''August 1879, Kullu For. Corr.,
HPSA, Shimla.
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ply of the timber demanded locally, still less for the supply
of deodar for export." 19 With the Indian Forest Act's approval in 1878, GOI increased pressure on the provincial
government to implement the Joint Report under the new
law. The words used in the report (forest reserves) being
similar to the most restrictive category of forests in the Law
(Reserved Forests), it was assumed that the new demarcation would proceed under the same provisions. The 1878
Act provided for two main categories of forests, Reserved
and Protected. Chapter II of the law described the provisions regarding Reserved Forests and was considered, then
and now, to be severe on local rights . Only such acts were
permitted as were expressly allowed in the particular forest. In contrast, Chapter IV, dealing with Protected Forests, allowed all acts that were not expressly prohibited in
the forest. In spite of assurance from forest officers regarding the well-being of local populations and the exercise of
their rights, the stringent provisions for Reserved Forests
raised Lyall's doubts. 20 The doubts remained, but the Government of Punjab went ahead and issued a notification in
December 1880 to undertake the demarcation and settlement of 62 blocks of forests, as given in the Joint Report,
under the provisions of Chapter II of the Indian Forest ActY

The issue of rights and the permanence offorests
As early as February 1881, sharp differences appeared
between the Settlement Officer, Alexander Anderson, and
Lt. Col. Stenhouse, Deputy Conservator of Forests, over
the issue of defining rights. 22 In March 1881, Stenhouse
wrote to his superiors, complaining of too many rights being allowed. 23 In a swift reply, William Schlich, the officiating Conservator of Forests, Punjab, agreed with Stenhouse
that the record of rights being prepared by Anderson was
inadequate to meet the demands of strict conservancy. 24
By May 1881, the Revenue and Forest Departments were
sharply divided on the desirable course of action. Forest
19
B.H. Baden-Powell, CF, Punjab, to Secy to FC, Punjab,
No.115C.L., dated Simla, 3'd September 1878, Kullu For. CoiT.,
HPSA, Shimla.
20
F. C. Channing, Settlement Secy to FC, Punjab, to Offg. Secy
to Govt., Punjab, No. 276S, dated Lahore, 24"' March1881, Kullu
For. CoiT., HPSA, Shimla.
21
F.D. Cunnigham, Offg. Secy to Govt., Punjab, to Secy to
FC, Punjab, No. 216F, dated Lahore, 25"' April 1881, Kullu For.
CoiT., HPSA, Shimla.
22
A. Anderson, Asst. Comm., Kullu, to DCF, Kullu, No.43,
dated camp Jagatsukh, 14'h February 1881, Kullu For. Corr.,
HPSA, Shimla.
.
23
Col. W. Stenhouse, DCF, Punjab, Beas Forest Div.,to CF,
Punjab, No.288C, dated 14th March 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA,
Shimla.
24
W Schlich, CF, Punjab, to DCF, Beas Div., demi-official
dated camp via Chakrata, 2"d May 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA,
Shimla.

officials were adamant that only full closure of all forests
suggested in the Joint report as Reserved Forests under the
India Forest Act could meet the requirements of forest conservancy. Revenue officials, right up to the provincial level,
were convinced that this was unnecessary and would prove
to be disastrous for the local populations and harm the peace
and prosperity of the region. One particular characteristic
was repeatedly highlighted to indicate the anomalous nature of the tract, and hence the difficulty of a strict and full
closure of the deodar forests. This was that deodar prefened the same gentle slopes that were used by the people
for cultivation, leading to a patchwork-quilt of villages and
precious forests. The closure of large deodar forests would
necessarily inconvenience a disproportionately high number of people. It was during this deadlock that the blame
was laid squarely at the altar of Chapter II of the Forest
Act, pertaining to Reserved Forests and its prerequisite of
full extinguishment of rights. Colonel Davies, Commissioner of the Jullunder Division, suggested that the provisions of Chapter IV of the Forest Act, pertaining to Protected Forests, would have been more than sufficient to
meet the suggestions given in the Joint Report without causing undue restrictions on the local people. 25 Lyall, now the
Financial Commissioner of Punjab, quickly put his weight
behind his subordinates and supported the use of Chapter
IV in dealing with the situation. 26
Forest officials reacted with predictable dismay at the
proposal. Major Bailey, Conservator of Forests, Punjab,
asserted that one of the principal objectives of the Joint
Report was to "secure for the use of the people of the country as well as for export a sufficient and permanent supply
of timber and other forest produce" (emphasis in original)Y
It was argued that "Reserved Forests are the only kind of
forests that can permanently exist" and that the provisions
for Protected Forests were far too nebulous to ensure against
the "growth of private rights" and "prevention of fire." It
was precisely with a view to the well- being of local people
and forests that reservation of forests and curtailment of
rights was desirable. 28
It was in the context of the war of the chapters that
Lyall pointed out that "action taken under Chapter II would

25
Col. W.G. Davies, C&S, Jullunder Div., to Secy to FC,
Punjab, No.1247, dated Jullunder, 25u' May 1881, Kullu For. CoiT.,
HPSA, Shimla.
26
F.C.Channing, Secy to FC, Punjab, to CF, Punjab,
No.129C.S., dated 27"' September 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA,
Shimla.
27
"Memorandum on the Settlement of rights in Kullu Forests, with special reference to Financial Commissioner's No.129,
dated 27'h September 1881", Major F. Bailey, CF, Punjab, to Secy
to FC, Punjab, pp 17, Kuilu For. CoiT., HPSA, Shimla.
28
ibid., pp 19.
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only affect the demarcated forests." The need of the hour
was to cover all the forests under the demarcation, which
could be done only under the provisions of Chapter IV,
"giving all the power required to preserve the forests, to
prevent the growth of rights, and to cany out the policy of
the Joint Report". He recommended that a new notification be issued "declaring the provisions of Chapter IV applicable to all the forest and waste lands." 29 This recommendation was accepted, and in April 1882 the Government of Punjab reversed its earlier decision to apply Chapter II to limited and designated forests and issued a fresh
notification proclaiming the application of Chapter IV of
the Indian Forest Act to all the forests and waste lands of
Kullu. The project of intensive territorialization, initiated
by the Forest Department, was transformed by Revenue
Department officials into extensive territorialization. 30

Central Direction, Local Knowledge
Brandis, Inspector General of Forests, struck back with
a detailed memo in July 1882, taking issue with Lyall that
deodar groves were interlocked everywhere with cultivation and contending that this was so only in ltmited areas.
The memo explained in detail his reservations that Protected Forests constituted under Chapter IV could not prevent the growth of rights and destruction by fires. Clearly
outlining his program of intensive demarcation, he suggested that in exchange for extinguishing rights in the demarcated forests, more rights be allowed in the excluded
parts. Brandis quoted at length the system that had evolved
in the nearby and topographically similar region of Jaunsar
in the neighboring United Provinces, where 142 of a total
of 400 square miles had been demarcated as Reserved Forests. Of the 142, twenty-four had been carved out as first
class reserves with no rights at all and completely at the
disposal of the department. The memo proposed that the
system followed in Jaunsar of dividing the Reserved Forests into two classes could be followed in Kullu, whereby
a small portion could be liberated from rightsY
29

F. C. Channing, Secy to FC, Punjab, to Secy to Govt., Punjab,
No.l08, dated Lahore, 11 "'February 1882, Kullu For. Con., HPSA,
Shimla.
30
I use the terms 'demarcation' and 'tenitorialization' separately and non-interchangeably. Demarcation refers to the drawing of boundaries around forests that delineate them as state property. The use of symbols such as fire-lines and boundary pillars
that have been a featme of demarcation in Kullu serve as much to
demarcate as to territorialize, as in allocation of property rights
and detennination of resource-use patterns in forests . However,
tenitorialization is much more than demarcation and entails a
configuration of authority and power, through demarcation.
31 "Memorandum on the Forests of Kullu, Punjab, by D.
Brandis, Inspector-General of Forests, on special duty,
Ootacamund, the 20"' July 1882", Home Dept., Forests, Govt. of
India, 1882,
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The Government of India, taking a cue from Brandis's
memo, reacted sharply to Punjab's decision to apply Chapter IV instead of Chapter II. In August 1882, in a strongly
worded letter, it asked the Government of Punjab to explain its actions. Quoting Brandis, it observed that "there
is a doubt as to the accuracy of information placed before
the Government of Punjab, on which the orders of 1" April
1882 were based ." Officiating Inspector General of Forests William Schlich was dispatched to Kullu to report on
the ground situation. 32 Schlich toured Kullu in October
1882, accompanied by local revenue and forest officials.
His report vindicated every claim made by the provincial
government and its officers that the Government of India
had objected to and Brandis had contested. 33 In an effort to
work out a compromise during his tour of inspection, he
offered to reduce the extent of absolute reserves with no
rights to eighty square miles-down from 156 suggested
by Brandis and the 220 included in the original notifications.34
It was at this point that Anderson took the Forest Department aristocracy at the center completely head on. Taking issue with Brandis on his position that Reserved Forests with no rights were essential because of the adverse
impact of grazing on the regeneration of deodar, Anderson
quoted from an article on grazing that had appeared in the
December 1882 issue of the Indian Forester, the mouth
piece of the Forest Department.
The result of excluding cattle from deodar forests,
as far as natural reproduction goes, has not been at
all satisfactory. As a rule, the result of excluding
cattle after fellings have been made, is that a dense
growth of grass and bushes of all kinds has sprung
up, which, if it has not altogether prevented reproduction, has at all events, hindered a large number
of seeds from reaching the ground, and has also
probably choked many young seedlings before they
had the time to overtop the grass. 35
This was a masterful move, as the author of the article
was a forest officer and was referring to his observations
from the vantage point of Jaunsar, the favorite example of

32

A. Mackenzie, Secy to Govt. of India, to Junior Secy to
Govt. of Punjab, no.707F, Home Dept. (Forests), Simla, 21" August 1882, Kullu For. Con., HPSA, Shimla.
33
A. Mackenzie, Secy to Govt. of India, to Junior Secy to
Govt. of Punjab, no.666F, Home Dept. (Forests), Simla, 21" August 1883, Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla.
34
"Note by J.B.Lyall, Esquire, Financial Commissioner,
Punjab, regarding the treatment of the Forests in the Kullu part of
the Kangra District", enclosme in F.C.Channing, Senior Secy to
FC, Punjab, to Junior secy to Govt., Punjab, No.328, dated 12'"
March 1883, Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla.
35
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Brandis.36 Anderson supported this thesis from his own
observations in Kullu, reciting names of forests and villages where he had seen this happen and adding that "It
maybe that the reproduction is in consequence of the grazing, as Mr. Moir holds. But whether or not, it seems clear
that the exc lusion of cattle from deodar forests is not the
sine qua non to natural reproduction that it is said to be."
Grazing was, and has been until today, the primary objection that the Forest Department had been raising against
· demarcating the forests under Protected rather than Reserved Forest status. The argument ran that it was not possible to close forests to grazing unless these were reserved
and closed as in Jaunsar, and until that happened, there
was no question of any regeneration . And here was Anderson, quoting a forest officer based in Jaunsar about how
grazing was actually good for regeneration.
With this one stroke of luck, as it were, Anderson cast
senior forest officers, especially those with the Government of India such as Brandis and Schlich, in very poor
light and seized the initiative. The Government of Punjab
compiled a powerful response to the report submitted by
Schlich in November 1882. Enclosing memos from both
Lyall and Anderson, Government of Punjab refuted every
claim made by Schlich and rejected all proposals of a compromise.37 The Governor of Punjab summarily rejected the
suggested reduction in reserves to eighty square miles and
quoted from debates in the legislative council during the
formulation of the Indian Forest Act in 1878, asserting that
the lawmakers always meant the Protected Forests to be
maintained permanently.38 In a similar vein, Anderson
quoted Brandis from his memorandum on forest legislation of 1875 , where he had argued about the difficulty of
defining rights .39 Summoning all the evidence at his disposal, the Governor launched a frontal assault on the Government of India in July 1883, attacking the authors of the
Joint Report for misrepresenting their own recommendations and going beyond its limited scope. In summary, the
letter suggested that "the real point for consideration is not
whether proposals made in the Joint Report are to be adhered to or departed from , but how a system of forest demarcation and conservancy suitable to the conditions of
the district and the requirements of the case are best secured ."40
36
E. MeA. Moir, Deputy Conservator of Forests, Tons Division, NWP, 'Cattle Grazing in Deodar Forests', Indian Forester,
voLVIII no. 3-4, December 1882, pp 274-277.
37
H.C.Fanshawe, Offg. Junior Secy to Govt., Pu~jab and its
Dependencies, to A. Mackenzie, Secy to the Govt. of Indi a, Home
Dept. (Forests), dated Lahore, 5"' July 1883, Kullu For. Corr.,
HPSA, Sllimla.
38
ibid., Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla.
39
A. Anderson, Forest Settlement ·Officer, Kullu, to C&S ,
Jullunder Div., No. l07, dated Dharmsala, 16"' January 1883, Kullu
For. ColT., HPSA, Shimla.

The compromise : Vertical territorialization
Finally, as the dust settled on the war of the chapters,
final orders were issued in April 1883, and Anderson commenced the task of demarcating forests . Mov ing towards a
middle ground, these orders stipulated the formation of four
classes of forests, more than anybody had suggested earlier. The first of these was Reserved Forests under Chapter
II. All remaining unoccupied and unclaimed land would
be classified as Protected Forests, under Chapter IV of the
Forest Act. These were furth er sub-divided into 1", 2"d,
and 3'd classes. The 1" class would be those most valuable
forests that could not be completely divested of rights or
the ones that were too close to cultivation to be closed with
any degree of success. As far as possible, it was proposed
to "throw all rights in these forests" into the 2"d and 3'd
classes. The 2"d class comprised afforests not immediately
available for extraction owing to their inaccessibility, lack
of good timber species , or being burdened with rights . Both
these classes were to be demarcated with boundary pillars
as markers and mapped . The remaining were clubbed together as 3'd class forests, neither demarcated nor mapped,
but brought under the purview of the Forest Act and therefore state property. 41
The classification in the new notification represented a
compromise worked out at the local level between the Forest and Revenue Departments. Anderson worked assiduously, taking local forest officers along and demonstrating
a will to work together. In forging a local consensus, he
constantly harked back to the inappropriateness of the central model, criticizing Brandis and slighting Schlich while
at the same time asserting that "the policy of excluding
valuable forest in order to acquire more extensive powers
over the smaller area retained is quite unsuited to the circumstances ofKullu" while pointing out that "in this Colonel Stenhouse and Mr. Smith, the local fo rest officers, agree
with me." 42 The rules prepared at the end of 1884 for Protected Forests of the first two classes were drafted jointly
by Anderson and Smith, representing another level of consensus . During the demarcation and recording of rights,
Anderson remarked that the final outcome as a result of his
settlement was far more extensive and much more strict in
the allowance of rights than either Brandis's or Sch1ich 's
had suggested. 43
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The Forest Settlement Report, the first draft of which
was submitted for approval in 1886, resulted in vertical
territorialization that was a qualitative jump from the contrasting positions that it sprang from. It stood out for four
distinguishing characteristics compared to the system prevailing before. Firstly, it constituted a classification of forest classes that not only covered almost the entire forest
territory but demarcated forests into vertically graded categories that progressively curtailed people's rights with
respect to cultivation, fire, grazing and collection of forest
produce-from 3'd class Undemarcated Forests to Reserved
Forests. It put a large proportion of forests in 1" class protected forests, transferring rights therein to the 2"d and 3'd
class forests. The report provided the following breakdown
of the results of the demarcation: out of the total area of
Kullu (1926 square miles), 1,240 were demarcated into either reserved, 1",or 2"d class protected forests; of this 530
was wooded territory, significantly in excess of the 400
square miles estimated as forests in 1876, and 178 square
miles were reserved as l ''class protected forests, more than
twice the area offered by Schlich as a compromise in November 1882. Rights in 1" class forests were strictly recorded, as would have been the case for Reserved Forests.
Sheep and goats were excluded from l" class forests, except for a right of way in certain cases. Cultivation was
prohibited in both the 1'' and 2"d class forests, one of the
pre-conditions for permanence and a prime complaint of
Brandis, Schlich et al. More significantly, fu·e was also prohibited in both classes, thus meeting another objection to
the appropriateness of Protected Forests with respect to permanence.
The second major feature of the settlement was the creation of a supra-tenure in the form of special regulations
applied irrespective of their location. Thus, a list of 20 species was proposed as reserved and restrictions were placed
on their use over and above the restrictions on the forests
where these occurred. These restrictions took the form of
restricted timing of collection (for example, one week, twice
a year for lopping of blue pine) or even the height to which
certain trees could be lopped. It also resulted in a de facto
freezing of rights in time, effectively preventing the acquisition of new rights. Although a list of rights in every class
of forest was prepared, every right allowed to be exercised
in each 1" class forest was separately recorded "in order to
enforce a penalty against any act not included in the list,
and in that way prevent the springing up of new rights." 44
Even dry and fallen trees of deodar, walnut, box, and ash
were not to be used by the rightholders.
Thirdly, rights themselves were differentiated along
ownership of land by linking property rights in forests with
the payment of land revenue, effectively restricting the legal rights to forests through a vertical differentiation of

society. This had particularly serious repercussions on the
non-cultivating population, divesting them of legitimacy
in their claims on forests. Appending of forest rights to
land revenue introduced a dimension in nature-society interactions in Kullu that was a radical departure from pre. British customs. Access to forests in Kullu was umestricted
for local populations, subject to rights of the King for hunting, snaring of hawks, and customary rights of nomadic
pastoralists. Coupled with the injunction of acquisition on
new rights, this vertical perspective on property rights exacerbated social divisions and exploitative relations.
Lastly, greater powers were assumed by the forest officials than ever before. Whereas earlier, the Negi or the headman was authorized to sanction up to 40 trees of the inferior kind for house construction in almost all forests, the
new settlement restricted this authority to 10 trees in the
2"d and 3'd class forests and only for repairs . Only a Forest
Officer had the power to sanction trees for new houses and
as far as possible, these were to be given from 2"d and 3'd
class forests. In addition, these trees were to be paid for at
subsidized rates . It is important here to reiterate that the l"
class forests were very close to cultivation and habitation,
which was the reasoning put forward for the impossibility
of demarcating them as reserved, and the 2"d class forests
were mostly far from villages. With the shifting of rights
from 1" class to 2"d class forests, in addition to the temporal restrictions on use of forest resources, the new rules
were to have a profound impact on life in the Kullu valley.
The Settlement Report, representing the new detente
in the form of vertical territorialization, reflected the casual sanguinity of the bureaucracy in having surmounted
troubling conflicts and establishing a rule of law over the
forests. The general feeling was that "[t]he course of forest
conservancy in the past has been a gradual imposing of
such restrictions as experience showed to be necessary. The
people have learnt to accept them, and a similar procedure
in the future will, it is believed, be found satisfactory for
the forests as well as the people." 45 That was, alas, not to
be.

The irrelevance of legal categories and the futility of
boundaries
Anderson, in association with local forest officers, demarcated more than 1,200 square miles of state forests between 1883 and the middle of 1886. During this period,
the barrage of correspondence relating to forest issues in
Kullu slowed to a trickle, reflecting the consensus on the
course of action. However, dissenting murmurs could be
heard with the publication of the report and cracks in the
detente began to appear by early 1887. 46
45
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Fire
Without waiting for the proposals to be sanctioned,
which required these to go through the provincial government to the Government of India, D.C. Johnstone, Assistant Commissioner and 0. Down, Deputy Conservator of
Forests implemented the new proposed rules and cracked
down particularly on fire. There was a drought in the region, with rains failing in the summer of 1886 as well as
1887, and there was much distress. The situation was compounded when officials began enforcing the new rule requiring permission of a forest officer before burning of
grasslands. Johnstone, in sympathy with his colleagues in
the Forest Department, believed "that the people often purposely set fire to grasslands when their herds and flocks
are badly off for fodder, on the principle that being fined is
a lesser evil than having severe mortality of cattle and
sheep." He solved his predicament with respect to the administration of justice in the following manner :
[T]he difficulty when no actual perpetrator is found,
and where no clue is available as to whether the fire
was accidental or not, is to know whether to treat
the fire as one for which the zamindars should be
held responsible . ... In most instances, I had to
prosecute, for in these cases there was practically
nothing to guide the judgment, and to let off one
batch of zamindars would have involved letting off
the whole in every such case. 47
During the single summer of 1887, Johnstone served
sentences in 68 cases of fire in his court, amounting to a
total fine of more than six thousand rupees 48 and attracting
a barrage of protests from local residents. Zamindars complained to higher officials, particularly the Commissioner
and Superintendent of J ullunder division and the Financial
Commissioner of Punjab. Petitions continued throughout
the summer and autumn of 1887, detailing the injustices
perpetrated against the people. 49 The petitions, many times
authored by European settlers in the valley on behalf of the
missioner, Punjab" in Report on the Forest Settlement of Kullu,
Kangra Distiict, Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Forest
Department, Apiil 1894, Nos.30-121, (henceforth For. Progs. Apru
1894, HPSA, Shimla), No.32.
47
'Zamindar' was the generic name given to a land-revenue
paying cultivator in Kullu. Literally translated, it meant 'the owner
of land'. It should not be confused with the zamindars in Bengal
and Central Provinces, who were large estate holders created by
the British to facilitate the extraction of land revenue.
48
"Statement showing the total fires in Kullu Forests and
other forest offences, with total fines inflicted in the court of Assistant Commissioner, Kullu", For. Progs. April 1894, HPSA,
Shimla, No37 .
49
"Translation of a petition by the Zainindars, oftehsil Plaich,
in Kangra District, to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the
Punjab and the Financial Commissioner, Punjab", For. Progs. Apiil
1894, HPSA, Shimla, No.40.

local residents, also complained about the impracticality
of the new rules regarding timber for house construction
and expressed incredulity at being fined for collecting dead
leaves from the forest. But most of all, the people were
incensed at the enormity and unfairness of the fines. People
complained that the figures of trees destroyed by fire that
were quoted were completely false as the areas under question were grasslands burnt every year and therefore had no
trees . Even where forest fires erupted due to the exceptionally dry weather, residents claimed that they did their best
to put them out, but that these acts were ignored and the
people were fined anyway. 50

It was also alleged that people were so distressed that
there was an exodus from certain areas. Johnstone defended
himself against the accusation of inciting a flight of people
and asserted that "I do not believe that the fines were the
cause of the departure of the poor zamindars .... A succession of bad harvests is the real reason, and not fines of a
few annas per accused." 51 Coming down on his side, Gordon Young, Commissioner of the Jullunder Division,
blamed the lower functionaries of the Forest Department
for overstating their case and being generally over-enthusiastic and defended Johnstone's punitive measures. 52 The
Financial Commissioner was not amused. He severely reprimanded Johnstone and ordered that the forests be divided
into 'dangerous and non-dangerous zones' with respect to
prospects of damage by fire and the restrictions on firing
be removed in the non-dangerous zones. 53 Such a redrawing of boundaries was obviously anathema to the Forest
Department; it would have undone the work of a decade at
securing some sort of boundaries. But the Financial Commissioner would have none of it. In desperation, Col. Bailey,
Conservator of Forests, Punjab, responded to the
Commissioner's orders thus:
[I]n the absence of anything like a demarcation and
a map, mistakes, unintentional or intentional, and
disputes will, I think, constantly arise . ... .I think
the limits of the areas which may be burnt should
be defined by blazed trees, temporary heaps of
stones, marks cut into the turf, or in some such
manner. The restriction of the burning to the sanctioned areas is a matter of great importance, and I
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Senior Secy to FC, Punjab, to C&S, Jullunder Div. No.5964,
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consider that it is well worth while to take this
amount of trouble in the matter. 54
However, the problem was not merely of burning. There
were heaps of complaints about restrictions on timber for
house construction as well. The Forest Department, knowing fully well that the most valuable demarcated areas are
adjacent to cu ltivation and habitation, was coming down
heavily on trees felled on private lands on the plea that this
was necessary to prevent encroachment on state property.
Boundaries were being challenged on that front too, irrespective of where the fire lines were drawn. Just as boundaries to grazing were challenged earlier with respect to regeneration of deodar against the convictions of forest officers, fire and timber were forcing the local administration to redraw boundaries at every stage, putting pressure
on the already tenuous compromise and the consensus
around the Anderson Settlement.
In the end, local consensus broke down along familiar
inter-departmental fault lines. Col Bailey, responding to
the Commissioner's sympathies with the people, reverted
to the "good for the people" argument. Referring to the
forests of Kullu, he observed:
I do not think that the state could ever hope to obtain anything from them for export. All that they
can do is to provide permanently (if this can by any
means be secured) for a certain part of the wants of
the people; and if the officers of the Forest Department desire to see them protected in a manner sufficient to attain this end, they do so primarily in the
interests of the people themselves. 55
The new Conservator who replaced Bailey shortly, H.C.
Hill, went back to the old debate regarding extensive demarcation as against intensive demarcation and concluded
that it was most undesirable to have demarcated so much
in the first place and suggested that the policy of a smaller
area of strict reserves under Chapter II of the Indian Forest
Act would have been better. 56 The debate had come full
circle indeed.

Epilogue
The story continued in Kullu and the redrawing of the
boundaries never ceased. After the tumultuous events of
1887, the Settlement Report was sent back for revision. It
was resubmitted in 1892, leading to further discussion along

similar lines. The rules and the record of rights in Kullu
forests was finally accepted and notified by the Government oflndia in June 1897. 57 Major fires broke out in 1917,
1921, and 1944. 58 The Punjab Government set up a commission ofenquiry in 1935 to report on the difficulties experienced by the people who live close to the forests as a
result of the system of forest administration and suggest
remedial measures. 59 In the post-colonial period, restrictions were routinely relaxed on grazing; even Reserved
Forests hitherto closed to livestock were opened to herds,
in response to popular pressure now working through
elected representatives of the people. 60 The project of drawing permanent boundaries around forests could not be accomplished in any real sense; it was forever being negotiated.

Concluding remarks
Territorialization may be a project that is doomed to
fail, but the study of its nuances in Kullu provides us with
a few insights. Firstly, in the light of this evidence, the debate on territorialization through legal categories may be
viewed from a fresh perspective. In the discussions in India, the Forest Department has very often been cast as the
villain of the piece, willful and scheming, encroaching on
the rights of people. However, the roles could be recast in
terms of the binary that worked itself out in Kullu-extensive teiTitorialization, as in large areas with limited and
progressively curtailed rights, versus intensive tenitorialization, as in small and compact areas with summarily commuted rights. This binary takes us further in explaining the
geographical and institutional diversity of outcomes in the
territorialization project in colonial India, as witnessed in
the widely divergent experiences in Punjab, Bengal, Canara,
Madras, United Provinces, and Central Provinces.
The experience of Kullu also troubles the assumption
of territorialization through legal categories alone. As internal divisions frustrated attempts at demarcation of boundaries, the compromise of vertical territorialization can be
seen as a less legal and more nuanced attempt at addressing the problem of boundaries. It would be pertinent to
mention here that not only did the interpretation of legal
categories extend the law substantively, but that at the same
time it opened avenues for a gradual territorialization on
the vertical dimension. The gradual and vertical progress
of territorialization in Kullu is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it remains to be said that the vertically an·anged
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categories allowed for this possibility, going beyond the
deadlock between Reserved and Protected Forests or between extensive and intensive territorialization.
More specifically, the history of territorialization in
Kullu, even for the brief period explored in this paper, allows us to make better sense of the outcomes in 21" century Kullu, as evidenced in the events in the Great Himalayan National Park. Arguing for Thailand, Vandergeest and
Peluso contend that there is an inverse relationship between
the success of territorialization and the number of institutions that may legitimately enforce restrictions. "Where different legitimating authorities conflict in their allocation
of rights, the one that is most enforceable in practice (de
facto) will have a greater influence on behavior than de
jure controls." 61 This certainly seems to be true for Kullu
in the late 19'11 century as well as late 20' 11 century. Legitimacy emerged as the currency in Kullu in the 1880s, as
forest officers were alienated for allegedly excessive restrictions. It may be pertinent to note here that the situation
is not very different in the late 20' 11 century, with the revenue department retaining its edge, and the addition of
elected representatives to the list of "legitimating authorities." The overriding de facto authority of elected representatives in Kullu helped the people in rejecting therestrictive legal bracketing of "rightholders" according to a
narrow reading of the settlement records. The mirage of
permanent boundaries around forests, in the face of failure
to tenitorialize, has forced the Forest Department to invent new dimensions of imagining territory and create discourses for legitimacy. The third phase of teJTitorialization,
through scientific categories such as National Parks, represents another attempt of the Forest Department to derive
legitimacy for the unfinished project of territorialization.
The struggle for legitimacy, so crucial to enforcement,
is complicated by the presence of several actors at widely
varied levels and operating on different scales. In Kullu,
this matrix has worked itself into two inter-connected axes .
The first, the tensions between central monopoly and local
diversity, is played out and shifts between the local versus
the provincial levels and the central versus provincial levels at different times. The other axis, inter-departmental
conflicts and rivalry, is never far from the surface but is
occasionally buried in favor of local consensus. The two
axes are constantly struggling for balance, seeking legitimacy, forever denied by the people to any actor for too
long. In the context of territorialization, power is always
being negotiated with respect to enforceability. In the. context of the forests of Kullu, the ideal of permanent boundaries is doomed to failure, as challenges from below regarding the issues of grazing, fire, and timber for house
construction force the state apparatus to renegotiate the

61

equilibrium of legitimacy and necessitate a redrawing of
the boundaries. In this way, by the balancing of conflicting
interests and a shifting fulcrum, territorialization in Kullu
also helped the colonial state to emerge as an entity embedded in society rather than separate from it and laid the
foundations of the state-society relationship for the years
to come.
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